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Abstract: Prior International Political Economy (IPE) public opinion research has 
primarily examined how economic and socio-cultural factors shape individuals’ views on the 
flows of goods, people, and capital. What has largely been ignored is whether individuals 
also care about rewarding or punishing foreign countries for their policies on these 
subjects. To test this possibility, we administered a series of conjoint and traditional 
survey experiments in the United States and China that examined how reciprocity 
influences opposition to foreign acquisitions of domestic companies. We find that 
reciprocity is an important determinant of public opinion on the regulation of foreign 
investments. This suggests the need to consider the policies that other countries adopt 
when trying to explain public attitudes towards global economic integration.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 In 2016, populist movements swept across the globe. Most prominently, the 
United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union and the United States elected 
Donald Trump president. Although there are certainly many reasons for these results, 
the success of these populist campaigns have been seen, at least in part, as a rejection of 
global economic integration. One argument that was repeatedly used as a justification for 
rejecting integration is that other countries are behaving unfairly, and, as a result, that 
new restrictions are needed on the flows of people, goods, and capital.1 For example, 
Donald Trump repeatedly argued on the campaign trail that retaliations against China are 
needed because its trade and investment practices are unfair. In other words, Trump not 
only tried to appeal to voters by arguing that new restrictions on trade and investments 
from China may improve their economic prospects, but also that reciprocity requires 
them.  
Although a growing body of international political economy (IPE) scholarship 
has studied why individuals form preferences towards trade, immigration, and 
international investment, this literature has largely ignored whether the policies other 
countries adopt influence individual attitudes. Instead, this literature has primarily 
examined how economic and socio-cultural factors affect public opinion.2 For example, 
one line of this scholarship has found that economic factors—like an individual’s skill 
set, sector of employment, or asset holdings—are often highly correlated with views on 
trade and immigration.3 Another line of this scholarship has found that socio-cultural 
factors—like nationalism, out group resentment, and cosmopolitanism—are also highly 
correlated with views on these topics.4 Little research, however, has examined the extent 
to which the desire for reciprocity influences views on IPE.5   
                                                
1 See, e.g., Beinhocker 2016. 
2 Hellwig 2014, 2–3. 
3 Rho and Tomz 2017; Scheve and Slaughter 2001a; Scheve and Slaughter 2001b. 
4 Citrin et al. 1997; Lü, Scheve, and Slaughter 2012; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Margalit 2012. 
5 But see Bechtel and Scheve 2013; Jensen and Shin 2014. 
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In this paper, we provide evidence that reciprocity is an important determinant of 
public opinion in one area of international political economy: the regulation of foreign 
direct investment (FDI). Reciprocity, in this area, is the idea that policy makers can 
encourage other countries to open their markets to investments by permitting or 
restricting FDI. This concept is well understood by government officials. For example, 
former Secretary of Commerce Elliot Richardson has explained that the reason it is 
important for the United States to welcome FDI is that ‘[i]t is patently impossible to 
open doors for American business abroad while we slam shut the doors to foreign 
business in our own country.’ 6  Not only are government officials aware of the 
importance of reciprocity, it has driven the adoption of US policies on FDI: the United 
States’ process for regulating foreign investment emerged from concerns about the influx 
of FDI from Japan at a time when it maintained policies that denied reciprocal market 
access.7  
 But despite the ample evidence that reciprocity has been a major driver of FDI 
policy in the United States and other countries, it has not received much theoretical 
attention from IPE scholarship. Over the last two decades, a growing body of IPE 
research has sought to understand why counties regulate FDI. 8 Given that a major 
finding of that literature is that regulations on inward FDI are based on domestic 
political considerations, it is not surprising that a related line of scholarship has emerged 
studying the determinants of public support for inward FDI flows.9 These studies have 
focused, however, on using public opinion data and surveys to evaluate how skills and 
economic position influence individual support for inward foreign investment.   
To our knowledge, scholars have not yet evaluated whether reciprocity influences 
public support for restrictions on FDI flows. But there are good reasons to believe that it 
                                                
6 Richardson 1989, 282. 
7 Kang 1997; Milhaupt 2008; Prestowitz 1988. 
8 For a review of this scholarship, see Pandya 2016, 459–60. 
9 Jensen and Lindstädt 2013; Kaya and Walker 2012; Linsi 2016; Pandya 2010; Pandya 
2014b; Scheve and Slaughter 2004; Zhu 2015. 
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would. For one, foundational research in international relations has long theorized that 
reciprocity can play an important role in international affairs as a way of inducing co-
operative behavior.10 This logic may lead individuals to think reciprocity is important to 
ensuring that foreign governments provide access to their markets. Alternatively, recent 
research has shown that reciprocity can be an important driver of individual foreign 
policy preference.11 This research has built, in part, on findings from psychology and 
behavioral economics suggesting that individuals care deeply about fairness, and thus are 
likely to respond positively to others that behave co-operatively and to punish others that 
behave unfairly. This suggests that an important driver of individual support for foreign 
investments may be whether the potential investments are from countries that allow 
reciprocal investments. In other words, people might not just care about how the 
investment could affect their economic or physical security, but also whether they think 
that allowing it is fair.   
In order to evaluate the effect of reciprocity on public opinion toward inward 
FDI, we fielded a series of survey experiments in the United States and China. We 
fielded two experiments to both a nationally representative sample of 2,010 adults in the 
United States and a stratified sample of 1,659 adults in China, and we fielded a third 
follow-up experiment to a sample of 838 respondents recruited through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk service. Our primary experiment used a conjoint design that allowed us 
to directly compare the relative influence of reciprocity and a number of factors 
previously theorized as driving opposition to foreign investments. This experiment asked 
respondents whether the government should block a series of hypothetical acquisitions 
of domestic firms by foreign companies. Our second and third experiments focused on 
positive and negative reciprocity by asking respondents how they thought their 
government should respond to one of several changes that a foreign country could make 
to its inward investment policies.  
                                                
10 E.g. Axelrod 1984; Keohane 1984. 
11 Brewer et al. 2004; Kertzer et al. 2014; Kertzer and Rathbun 2015. 
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The results of these experiments suggest that reciprocity is an important 
determinant of public opinion on the regulation of foreign investments. In both the 
United States and China, respondents were consistently more likely to oppose foreign 
acquisitions when the foreign firm’s home country did not provide reciprocal market 
access. More specifically, in our conjoint experiment, American respondents were 16 
percentage points—and Chinese respondents were 19 percentage points—more likely to 
oppose a potential acquisition when the foreign firm’s home country prohibited market 
access. We also found suggestive evidence that respondents may be more supportive of 
punishing negative reciprocity than they were of rewarding positive reciprocity. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
 
2.1. Reciprocity & the Regulation of FDI 
 
China has recently made the importance of reciprocity to FDI policy a salient 
issue. Despite being one of the largest sources of outward FDI,12 China heavily restricts 
inward FDI. In fact, data compiled by the OECD suggests that China has more 
restrictions on inward FDI than any other OECD or BRIC country.13 This lack of 
reciprocity in FDI policy has emerged as a major source of friction between China and 
other countries. A 2016 Brookings Institution report even argued that the ‘lack of 
reciprocity between China’s investment openness and the US system is the most 
worrisome of the trends’ in investment between the two countries.14  
This concern over a lack of reciprocity is not new—China simply provides the 
most recent example of this phenomenon. Concerns over reciprocity have long been 
identified as a major driver of investment policy in the United States and other 
                                                
12 Sauvant and Nolan 2015. 
13 This data is available at <http://www.oecd.org/investment/fdiindex.htm> (last visited 
May 25, 2016).  
14 Dollar 2016, 18. 
 5 
countries. 15  For example, the restrictions that the United States places on foreign 
investments were developed in the 1980s in response to apprehensions over the rise of 
investment from Japan when it was not open to reciprocal investments from America.16 
As one scholar wrote, ‘the largest underlying cause of friction over Japanese FDI in the 
1980s was the perception that, while the US was wide open to Japanese investment and 
imports, US firms faced substantial barriers to investment and trade in Japan.’17 
There have even been proposals to base US investment policies explicitly on the 
principle of reciprocity. For example, Prestowitz argued that the US should restructure 
regulations on foreign investments to give foreign firms only the access and protections 
that their home countries provided to American firms.18 A bill enshrining this proposal 
has even been repeatedly introduced in the United States Congress,19 and US policy 
toward some industries has explicitly incorporated reciprocity requirements.20  
 
 
 
 
                                                
15  Although we focus on the United States, reciprocity is also an important driver of 
investment policies in other countries. For example, during the takeover of the British candy 
company Rowntree by the Swiss company Nestlé in 1988, there was a debate in the House 
of Commons on the significance of the lack of reciprocity that Switzerland provided to 
investors from the UK <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1988/jun/08/ 
rowntree-plc#column_850> (last visited May 25, 2016). 
16 Kang 1997; Prestowitz 1988. 
17 Milhaupt 2008, 7. 
18 Prestowitz 1988. 
19  See Investment Policy Must be based on Reciprocity, March 12, 1991 (Statement of Tom 
Campbell, member of Congress from California).   
20 Graham and Krugman 1995, 123. 
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2.2. IPE Scholarship on the Regulation of FDI 
 
Despite the evidence that reciprocity influences the regulation of FDI, it has not 
been a major topic of IPE research. Over the last two decades, a growing body of 
scholarship has examined the regulations that countries place on FDI flows.21 More 
specifically, this literature has studied why countries either adopt policies to encourage 
inward FDI flows—like providing tax holidays—or policies to restrict inward FDI 
flows—like restricting foreign acquisitions of domestic firms.22  
These papers have primarily examined the economic and non-economic factors 
that influence whether countries encourage or restrict inward FDI. For example, Pandya 
argued that democracies adopt fewer restrictions on inward FDI because the general 
public favors these policies due to Inward FDI’s positive effect on wages. According to 
Pandya, autocratic regimes, on the other hand, are less willing to liberalize because they 
are more responsive to the preferences of local firms that want to prevent competitors 
from entering their market. 23  In related research, Owen argued that labor unions 
                                                
21 See Crystal 1998; Crystal 2003; Crystal 2009; Graham and Krugman 1995; Graham and 
Marchick 2006; Jensen et al. 2014; Kang 1997; Li and Resnick 2003; Meunier 2014; Owen 
2013; Owen 2015; Pandya 2010; Pandya 2014a; Pandya 2014b; Pinto and Pinto 2008; Pinto 
2013. 
22 It is worth noting that there is a great deal of IPE research on other topics, including: the 
factors that make countries more likely to receive increased FDI flows (e.g. Büthe and 
Milner 2008; Pandya 2010), the role that political institutions play in attracting FDI (e.g. 
Jensen 2003; Jensen 2008; Li and Resnick 2003), and FDI’s effect on economic growth and 
development (e.g. Aitken and Harrison 1999; Bornschier, Chase-Dunn, and Rubinson 1978; 
Jackman 1982).  
23 Pandya 2014a. 
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opposed to inward FDI use their political power to block it in their industries.24 To 
support this argument, Owen presented evidence from nineteen developed countries 
suggesting that high unionization rates are associated with greater restrictions on inward 
FDI. Other studies have examined whether restrictions on inward FDI are based on 
security considerations. Graham and Marchick reviewed controversial attempts by 
foreign firms to acquire American companies and concluded that, although those 
opposed to acquisitions often invoked national security concerns, their motivations were 
primarily economic.25 
These studies have primarily used observational data, but a few studies have 
examined the determinants of individual attitudes towards FDI.26 For instance, Scheve 
and Slaughter found that British workers in high FDI industries perceived themselves as 
having less job security. 27  In another study, Pandya used public opinion data from 
eighteen Latin American countries to show that individual preferences towards FDI are a 
function of its distributional effects on income.28 Relatedly, Kaya and Walker analyzed 
public opinion data from thirty-two countries and found that characteristics like higher 
education and private sector employment are associated with respondents being less 
likely to think that large multinational corporations hurt local business.29 Additionally, 
two recent working papers have used survey experiments to explore attitudes towards 
FDI. Jensen and Lindstädt conducted surveys in the United States and the United 
Kingdom to examine public support for FDI. They found, among other things, that the 
country that the foreign investment is from is a major determinant of opposition.30 Zhu 
                                                
24 Owen 2013; Owen 2015. 
25 Graham and Marchick 2006. 
26 For a review of this literature, see Pandya 2016, 458. 
27 Scheve and Slaughter 2004. 
28 Pandya 2010. 
29 Kaya and Walker 2012. 
30 Jensen and Lindstädt 2013. 
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found that Chinese attitudes toward investment in high-skilled and low-skilled sectors 
differ, and that individual characteristics are an important predictor of attitudes towards 
both types of FDI.31 
Although this body of literature has gone a long way to explaining why countries 
may either encourage or restrict FDI, only a handful of papers have even considered 
how reciprocity influences FDI policies. For example, Crystal argued that one reason 
American firms have not lobbied hard for the US government to restrict FDI flows is 
that these firms profit from other governments not restricting inward investments.32 
Additionally, Tingley et al. found that one factor that predicts which attempted 
acquisitions of American companies by Chinese firms produce political opposition is 
whether China restricts investments in the same industries.33  
 
2.3. Why Reciprocity May Influence Public Opinion on FDI 
 
Although reciprocity has not played a major role in scholarship on the regulation 
of FDI, scholars have long understood that reciprocity plays an important role in 
international relations generally.34 Perhaps most notably, Robert Keohane argued that 
reciprocity is fundamental for explaining state behavior because it can allow ‘cooperation 
to emerge in a situation of anarchy.’35 The basic reason is that, even without hierarchical 
power structures, states can influence the actions of other states by reciprocally 
punishing or rewarding them.  
                                                
31 Zhu 2015. 
32 Crystal 1998. 
33 Tingley et al. 2015. 
34 See, e.g., Axelrod 1984; Dixon 1986; Goldstein and Pevehouse 1997; Keohane 1984; 
Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001; Richardson, Kegley, and Agnew 1981; van Wyk and 
Radloff 1993; Ward 1981. 
35 Keohane 1986, 27. 
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Reciprocity has not only been used to explain international relations generally, but 
also specific areas of IR. For instance, reciprocity is a critical part of international trade 
policy.36 Indeed, scholars have argued that reciprocity has driven US trade policy since 
WWII.37 Further research has also shown that reciprocity plays an important role in 
security policy.38 Goldstein and Freeman argued that the interactions between the United 
States, the Soviet Union, and China during the Cold War can be best explained in terms 
of strategic reciprocity. 39  In another example, Morrow found that reciprocity largely 
explains compliance with the laws of war.40  
 Scholars have only recently begun to examine whether reciprocity might influence 
individual attitudes about international relations. Some research is informed by motivated 
by standard rational choice accounts of reciprocity’s role in conditional co-operation.41 
Other research has built on findings from psychology and behavioral economics showing 
that individual behavior may deviate from traditional rational choice models.42 One of 
these deviations is that, even when they have to forgo individual gains to do so, concern 
for equality and fairness may lead individuals to reward or punish others for ‘pro-self’ 
behavior. For example, individuals playing an ultimatum game in a lab may reject offers 
they view as unfair even though it means leaving money on the table.43 Although this line 
of scholarship has suggested that people may forgo individual gains to reward altruistic 
                                                
36 Bagwell and Staiger 2002. 
37 E.g. Gilligan 1997. 
38 Goldstein et al. 2001; Moore and Lanoue 2003. 
39 Goldstein and Freeman 1990. 
40 Morrow 2014. 
41 Tingley and Tomz 2014. 
42 For a discussion of the relevant literature, see Kertzer and Rathbun 2015.  
43 Rabin 2002. 
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behavior, ‘[t]here also seems to be an emerging consensus that the propensity to punish 
harmful behavior is stronger than the propensity to reward friendly behavior.’44 
 Drawing on these insights, a handful of papers have tested whether concerns 
about reciprocity influence foreign policy preferences. 45  Kertzer et al., for instance, 
studied how moral sentiments influence views on foreign policy and found that beliefs 
about fairness and reciprocity are a particularly important predictor of attitudes towards 
international relations generally. Similarly, Kertzer and Rathbun found that fairness 
concerns influence how participants in the lab behave in scenarios developed based on 
bargaining situations central to IR theory.46 Additionally, both Tingley and Tomz, and 
Bechtel and Scheve found that reciprocity could affect attitudes towards climate change 
policy,47 and Chilton found evidence indicating that reciprocity influences public support 
for complying with international legal obligations during interstate conflicts.48 
To our knowledge, previous public opinion research on individual support for 
investment flows has not directly tested whether the general public is concerned about 
reciprocity. The recent research on the role of reciprocity on foreign policy preferences, 
however, suggests that the policies other countries adopt should directly influence 
whether individuals are supportive of allowing foreign investments. In other words, even 
though at least some research has suggested that outward FDI hurts domestic wages and 
employment levels, 49  concern for fairness should make individuals want to punish 
countries that do not allow their own countries’ firms to enter their markets. This 
research also suggests that the desire to punish foreign countries for denying market 
                                                
44 Fehr and Gächter 2000. 
45 Bechtel and Scheve 2013; Brewer et al. 2004; Chilton 2015; Kertzer et al. 2014; Kertzer 
and Rathbun 2015; Tingley and Tomz 2014. 
46 Kertzer and Rathbun 2015. 
47 Bechtel and Scheve 2013; Tingley and Tomz 2014. 
48 Chilton 2015. 
49 Blomström, Fors, and Lipsey 1997. 
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access should be stronger than the desire to reward foreign countries for opening their 
markets. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
 
3.1. Research Method 
 
For a combination of substantive and methodological reasons, we chose to use 
survey experiments to research the relationship between reciprocity and support for 
restrictions on FDI. The first substantive reason is the strong relationship between 
democratic regimes and FDI flows. Existing evidence indicates that democracies attract 
more inward FDI50 and impose fewer restrictions on inward FDI.51 Since democracies 
are responsive to the concerns of the electorate, understanding whether the public cares 
about reciprocity is important for understanding how reciprocity influences FDI policy. 
Second, the returns on investments made by foreign multinational corporations are 
affected by how the public perceives a firm’s legitimacy.52 Understanding the sources of 
opposition to foreign investments is thus important for understanding investment 
patterns. Finally, despite the fact that a substantial body of research has examined public 
opinion regarding various international flows—like the flow of goods,53 foreign aid,54 and 
people across borders55—there has been comparatively little research on public attitudes 
toward FDI flows. 56  Using survey experiments allows us to bring FDI flows into the 
discussion of public opinion on IPE more generally.  
                                                
50 Jensen 2003; Jensen 2008. 
51 Pandya 2014a. 
52 Kaya and Walker 2012. 
53 E.g. Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006. 
54 E.g. Milner and Tingley 2013. 
55 E.g. Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010. 
56 But see Jensen and Lindstädt 2013. 
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There are also two methodological reasons that survey experiments are an 
appealing way to study the relationship between reciprocity and support for restrictions 
on FDI. First, since reciprocity likely correlates strongly with other factors that drive 
opposition to FDI, it is difficult to isolate the effect of reciprocity on opposition to FDI 
using observational methods. For example, there has been opposition to the surge in 
inward FDI from China in the United States57 and in Europe, 58 but that surge  happened 
at the same time that those economies experienced downturns. Using observational data, 
it is thus difficult to tell how much of the opposition is due to resentment that China 
heavily restricts inward FDI flows and how much is due to the perception that Chinese 
firms are taking advantage of a weak economy.59 Using survey experiments, however, it is 
possible to estimate the effect of reciprocity on opposition to inward FDI flows by 
varying levels of reciprocal market access while holding other features of the transaction 
constant. Second, there are ways to design survey experiments—like the conjoint design 
we use—that make it possible to simultaneously test the effects of many treatments. 
Although our primary interest is the effect of reciprocity, as we will discuss in Part 3.3, 
there have been a number of other factors that have also been hypothesized as driving 
opposition to FDI.60 Our research design allows us to estimate the relative effect of 
reciprocity compared to other features of foreign investments that may drive political 
opposition.  
There are, of course, limitations to using survey experiments to study the 
influence of reciprocity on public opinion. For example, if a survey experiment asks 
                                                
57 Tingley et al. 2015. 
58 Meunier 2014. 
59 For instance, Jensen and Lindstädt (2013) found that public support for inward FDI was 
heavily influenced by what country a proposed investment came from (i.e. Americans were 
less supportive of investment from China than other countries). Experimental designs make 
it possible to further explore whether concerns about reciprocity partially explains this result. 
60 See Jensen and Lindstädt 2013; Tingley et al. 2015. 
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participants their reactions to foreign countries’ policies based on a reported static state 
of affairs (e.g. ‘country X has recently opened/restricted market access’), it may not 
accurately capture the temporal component of reciprocity. That is, in this case, 
reciprocity is about individual attitudes evolving in response to changes in policy over 
time, not reporting their current position after being informed of news. This may bias 
survey experiments towards finding an effect by failing to capture the ways that the 
evolution of policy over time may attenuate reactions. Also, survey experiments largely 
have research designs that rely on stated preference. Respondents may respond strongly 
in a survey, but not hold their view strongly enough to translate it into action.61  
 
3.2. Case Selection 
 
We focused on one type of foreign investment: Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&As).62 This is in part because we believe that focusing on a specific type of foreign 
investment is likely to generate more concrete views than simply asking respondents 
about attitudes toward foreign investments generally. Given our decision to focus on a 
specific type of investment, we chose to focus on M&As because we believe that they are 
more likely to generate political opposition. Moreover, prior observational research has 
examined factors that influence political opposition to M&As,63 which thus provides us 
with alternative hypotheses to test. 
We fielded our survey in the United States and China for three reasons. First, the 
United States and China are the world’s two largest recipients of inward FDI.64 As a 
result, these are the two countries where it is arguably most important to understand 
                                                
61 It is worth noting that a body of scholarship has suggested that public opinion is an 
important driver of globalization policy (Kono 2008; Scheve and Slaughter 2007). 
62There are two basic types of FDI: M&As and ‘Greenfield’ investments. M&A investments 
acquire existing ventures, while Greenfield investments start new ones. 
63 Tingley et al. 2015. 
64 Feldman 2015. 
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opposition to foreign investment. Second, the United States is a democratic country that 
has relatively low barriers to foreign FDI, whereas China is an autocratic country that has 
relatively high barriers to foreign FDI. Since prior research has consistently found 
differences in openness to FDI between democratic and autocratic countries, 65 
examining the United States and China allows us to test whether our findings are 
consistent across both regime types. Third, since the United States and China have spent 
years negotiating a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) that would increase the reciprocal 
protections afforded to foreign investors,66 research on public opinion in these two 
countries has the potential to influence an important current policy debate. 
 
3.3. Alternative Determinants of Support for FDI 
 
Although our principle focus is on reciprocity, other factors may influence 
opposition to foreign acquisitions of domestic firms. As a result, we also tested other 
factors that have been shown to drive opposition to FDI. 
First, we examined the effect of the country of origin of the foreign firm. 
Previous research has found that public attitudes towards a range of international 
economic activities change based on the foreign countries involved. For example, Jensen 
and Lindstädt found that American respondents’ openness to foreign investments 
depended on those investments’ country of origin. 67  Relatedly, both Strezhnev and 
Umaña, Brenauer, and Spilker found that support for preferential trade agreements 
changed based on whether the country was a democracy or autocracy.68 Finally, Li and 
Vashchilko showed that bilateral FDI flows were affected by national security 
concerns. 69  We thus tested whether opposition to foreign acquisitions of domestic 
companies changes based on whether the foreign firm was from China, Japan, or Saudi 
                                                
65 Pandya 2016. 
66 Hao 2015. 
67 Jensen and Lindstädt 2013. 
68 Strezhnev 2013; Umaña, Brenauer, and Spilker 2015. 
69 Li and Vashchilko 2010. 
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Arabia;70 whether a country is democratic or not; or whether a country is a security or 
economic threat. 
 Second, we examined the effect of the type of Ownership of the foreign firm. 
Previous research has suggested that American politicians are more likely to oppose 
foreign investments from state-owned enterprises.71 This is perhaps because acquisitions 
by state-owned enterprises are more likely to be viewed as negatively affecting economic 
or national security. 72  As a result, we tested whether opposition towards foreign 
acquisitions of domestic companies changes based on whether the foreign firm was 
‘privately owned’ or ‘government owned.’ 
 Third, we examined the effect of the domestic firm being in an industry that is 
sensitive for national security. The primary way that a foreign acquisition of an American 
company can legally be blocked in the United States under a review process that 
regulates foreign investments is if the transaction poses a risk to national security.73 
Moreover, previous research has shown that American politicians are more likely to 
oppose specific transactions when the target firm is in an industry that is important to 
national security.74 We therefore tested whether opposition towards foreign acquisitions 
of domestic companies changes based on whether the foreign firm was in an industry 
that posed a ‘low’ or ‘high’ risk to national security. 
Fourth, we examined the effect of the Firm Size of the target firm. It would be 
reasonable to believe that opposition to foreign acquisitions would be higher for large 
                                                
70 These three countries were selected for two reasons. First, foreign acquisitions from these 
countries have generated opposition in the United States (Tingley et al. 2015). Second, 
attitudes toward these countries have previously been examined in research on foreign 
investment (Jensen and Lindstädt 2013). 
71 Tingley et al. 2015. 
72 Krugman 1994. 
73 Zaring 2010. 
74 Tingley et al. 2015. 
 16 
target firms with national profiles. This could be the case, for example, if those firms are 
seen as particularly important for the country’s economic security or national identity. 
Relatedly, previous research has shown that American politicians are more likely to block 
specific transactions when the target firm has a value of over $200 million. 75  We 
therefore tested whether opposition towards foreign acquisitions of domestic companies 
changes based on whether the target firm was a ‘small company based in your area’ or a 
‘large Fortune 500 company.’ 
Finally, we examined the effect of the target firm’s industry being in Economic 
Distress. It has been theorized that opposition to foreign acquisitions of domestic firms 
is likely to be greater when the domestic firm has experienced an economic downturn 
relative to the rest of the country. 76  Moreover, research has shown that American 
officials have blocked transactions when the targeted firms are in industries experiencing 
economic distress and high rates of unemployment. 77  We therefore tested whether 
opposition towards foreign acquisitions of domestic companies changes based on 
whether the target firm is in an industry that has ‘lower’ or ‘higher’ rates of 
unemployment than the national average. 
 
4. PRIMARY EXPERIMENT 
 
4.1. Subject Recruitment 
 
 Our Primary Experiment was conducted using an online survey administered to 
respondents recruited by Survey Sampling International (SSI). SSI conducts surveys for 
corporate and academic research in over 100 countries. We first administered our 
experiment to a sample of 2,010 adults from the United States. This sample was 
nationally representative of the adult population of Americans based on gender, age, 
ethnicity, and census region. We subsequently administered our experiment to a sample 
                                                
75 Tingely et al. 2015. 
76 Crystal 2003. 
77 Kang 1997; Tingley et al. 2015. 
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of 1,659 adults from China that was stratified to reflect the Chinese population’s gender, 
age, and region. The surveys were administered two weeks apart in February 2015.78 
 
4.2. Survey Design 
 
Our Primary Experiment used a conjoint design. Conjoint analysis is a marketing 
tool that has recently started to be used in political science.79 Conjoint analysis presents 
respondents with a profile or vignette where multiple attributes are randomly and 
independently varied. For example, respondents may be presented the biography of a 
hypothetical political candidate where characteristics like the candidate’s age, gender, 
profession, political positions, and party identification are randomly varied. The 
respondents would then be asked to evaluate several profiles or vignettes, and each time 
they would be presented with a different combination of attributes. This conjoint design 
makes it possible to then estimate the relative effect of each characteristic on the 
respondents’ answers.  
Conjoint analysis offers several advantages.80 First, conjoint analysis improves 
causal inference because it is possible to identify the effect of factors on individual 
preferences without making functional form assumptions. Second, conjoint analysis 
allows researchers to test many different hypotheses in a single research design. Third, 
conjoint analysis enhances realism by asking respondents to evaluate choices with 
multiple pieces of information, unlike traditional designs, which attempt to isolate 
preferences along a single dimension. Fourth, conjoint analysis asks respondents to 
register a single behavioral outcome—like supporting or opposing a given policy—which 
makes it possible to evaluate the relative explanatory power of multiple theories. Fifth, 
conjoint designs give respondents multiple reasons to justify any policy decision. Sixth, 
conjoint analysis is an excellent way to evaluate policy designs because it makes it 
                                                
78 Part 1 of the Supplementary Materials provides information on subject recruitment and 
Part 2 reports the respondents’ demographic characteristics. 
79 Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014. 
80 Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014. 
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possible to predict which components of various policies are likely to have the most 
support. Seventh, recent research has suggested that the realistic properties of conjoint 
analysis result in high degrees of external validity.81 
Although conjoint analysis has been used to study a number of topics in IPE,82 to 
our knowledge, our experiment is the first to use a conjoint design to study the flow of 
capital. In our conjoint experiment, respondents were asked to evaluate transactions 
where a foreign firm is proposing to buy a domestic company.83 We randomly varied 
features of each transaction related to the previously outlined hypotheses. More 
concretely, respondents in the United States were presented with the following vignette: 
 
Company A is a company based in [Country Treatment] that is [Ownership 
Treatment]. Company A is currently attempting to acquire an American 
company in an industry that is considered to pose a [National Security 
Treatment] risk to national security. The American company is a [Firm Size 
Treatment]. The American company is in an industry that is experiencing 
[Economic Distress Treatment] than the American economy overall. The 
country that Company A is based in currently has [Reciprocity Treatment] in 
the same industry. 
 
The text for the six-bolded treatments was randomly and independently varied. 
The options for each of the six treatments are presented in Table 1. In total, by randomly 
varying all of the options in Table 1, respondents in the United States were asked to 
evaluate 576 different possible transactions. 
                                                
81 Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Yamamoto 2015. 
82 For example, conjoint experiments have been used to study the factors that determine 
individual preferences on potential trade agreements (Strezhnez 2013; Umaña, Bernhauer, 
and Spilker 2015); the determinants of support for expanding immigration (Hainmueller and 
Hopkins 2015); the types of countries to which people prefer to send foreign aid (Hansen et 
al. 2014); and support for global climate change agreements (Bechtel and Scheve 2013). 
83 Part 3 of the Supplementary Materials provides the wording of the conjoint experiment 
that we fielded to respondents in the United States and China.  
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After reading about the potential transaction, the respondents were asked 
whether their government should prevent the proposed acquisition. The respondents 
were only given two options to register their opinion: yes or no. By doing so, we used a 
ratings-based conjoint design 84  as opposed to a choice-based conjoint design. 85  The 
respondents were then asked to evaluate four more potential transactions, but each one 
presented the respondents with a different random set of treatments.86 
There are four features of the vignettes used in our conjoint experiment worth 
discussing. First, although some conjoint designs vary the order in which the treatments 
are presented, our design always presented the treatments in the same order. Using an 
invariant order has the advantage of allowing the vignette to take the form of a realistic 
paragraph and is consistent with several other recent papers that have used vignettes in 
conjunction with a conjoint design. 87  Presenting treatments in a fixed order does, 
however, introduce an additional assumption into our research design: that the order of 
the attributes does not affect the results. It is thus possible that the ordering of the 
treatments biases our results and limits our ability to comparatively evaluate the effects 
of treatments.  
Second, the question we asked after the vignette was framed negatively (that is, 
should the government block the proposed transaction). We choose this formulation 
because it represents the policy choice that officials, at least in the United States, face. 
The US default is that foreign acquisitions of American companies are allowed,88 but the 
CFIUS process allows the government to block transactions that pose a national security 
                                                
84 See, e.g., Huff and Kertzer 2017. 
85 See, e.g., Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015. 
86 Part 7 of the Supplementary Materials presents the results of our experiment when only 
analyzing the results of the first vignette that each respondent evaluated.  
87 E.g. Carnes and Lupu 2016; Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Yamamoto 2015; Huff and 
Kertzer 2017.  
88 Zaring 2010. 
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risk.89 The implication is that policy leaders are likely to be focused on when citizens 
want a transaction blocked, not when they want it approved. A concern with this 
decision is that the negative framing may prime respondents to be less supportive of 
transactions. That said, we do not believe this causes a substantial problem for our 
research for two reasons: we are interested in relative effects of treatments (not absolute 
levels of support for foreign transactions) and we conducted two additional experiments 
that use a neutral framing.  
Third, although we varied six features of the transactions in the survey fielded in 
the United States, we were only able to vary four features in the survey fielded in China. 
We intentionally designed the surveys to be comparable, but shortly before our survey 
launched in China we were denied legal approval to ask Chinese respondents questions 
that highlighted rivalries with foreign countries or national security concerns. Given this 
constraint, Chinese respondents were given an amended version of the vignette that did 
not contain the Country Treatment or the National Security Treatment. 
Fourth, there are several aspects of the wording of our vignette that may bias or 
limit the generalizability of our results. For example, our Country Treatment included 
types of countries—e.g., a ‘democratic country’—as well as three specific countries 
where there has been specific hostility to foreign investments in the US: China, Japan, 
and Saudi Arabia. We did not, however, include specific countries from which 
respondents may respond favorably to foreign investment. Our results thus do not allow 
us to say how respondents may have reacted to countries that may have been viewed 
more favorably. To put it another way, the ‘context’ of our vignette likely moderates the 
effect of reciprocity, and since we only asked about reciprocity in specific contexts and 
not the universe of possible cases, drawing broad generalizations from our findings may 
be inappropriate. 
For our National Security Treatment, we varied whether the company is in an 
industry that ‘poses’ a high or low risk to national security. This was because specific 
                                                
89 In practice, transactions may be blocked for other reasons and simply justified on national 
security grounds (Graham and Marchick 2006). 
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industries are subject to greater scrutiny during the CFIUS review process based on their 
relevance to national security. A more natural way to word this treatment, however, may 
have been how ‘relevant’ the industry is to national security. Phrasing the treatment in 
terms of risk may have thus have created confusion that biased the results for this 
treatment.   
Finally, our Firm Size Treatment varied whether the company was either ‘a 
small company based in your area’ or a ‘national Fortune 500 company.’ Although it 
reduced the total number of treatments to combine the geographic reach and size of the 
company, confounding these variables makes it impossible to disentangle their effects.  
 
4.3. Results 
 
 Figure 1 presents the result for the respondents in the United States.90 The dots 
are point estimates, and the lines are 95% confidence intervals, of the influence that each 
attribute has on the probability that respondents would support the government blocking 
a proposed foreign acquisition of an American company. 91 The option listed first for 
each treatment are baseline categories that serve as the benchmark for our estimates, and 
they thus do not have a point estimate or confidence interval. For example, the baseline 
for the Country Treatment is a ‘foreign country.’ Figure 1 thus shows that when a firm is 
from ‘a country [that] is a security threat to the United States,’ respondents are 11 
                                                
90 Part 6 of the Supplementary Materials presents all of our results in tables.  
91 The analysis of our conjoint experiment follows the approach suggested by Hainmueller, 
Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014). They demonstrate that, since the attributes are randomly 
assigned in a conjoint analysis, it is possible to compare the relative importance of a given 
attribute with another given attribute by comparing their means. This quantity of interest—
known as the Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs)—can be non-parametrically 
identified when the attributes are independently randomized and the outcome of interest is 
binary. Both of those requirements are true of our experimental design. 
 22 
percentage points more likely to support the government blocking the acquisition than 
when the firm is from a ‘foreign country.’ 
 Figure 1 reveals that levels of reciprocal market access in a foreign firms’ home 
country have a substantial impact on support for blocking an acquisition. Compared to a 
baseline of no restrictions, opposition increases by 11 percentage points when the 
foreign firms’ home country has ‘a number of restrictions’ on American firms acquiring 
their companies and by 16 percentage points when the home country has ‘an absolute 
prohibition’ on American firms acquiring their companies. Interestingly, although market 
access restrictions substantially increased opposition, support only increased by 1 
percentage point when the foreign firms’ home country had signed a treaty permitting 
American companies to acquire their companies. 
Figure 1 also confirms prior research suggesting that the characteristics of the 
country of origin have a substantial effect on opposition to foreign investment.92 Our 
results suggest that respondents are 11 percentage points more likely to oppose an 
acquisition by firms from countries describe as security threats to the United States and 
15 percentage points more likely to oppose an acquisition by a firm from a country that 
is both a security and economic threat. Interestingly, firms that are from countries that 
are just economic threats—and not security threats—only increased opposition over the 
baseline by 4 percentage points. Additionally, support increases by 8 percentage points 
when the foreign firm is from a democratic country and decreases by 4 percentage points 
when the foreign firm is from a non-democratic country. 
In addition to testing types of countries, we also asked about three specific 
countries: China, Japan, and Saudi Arabia. As previously noted, we selected these 
countries because proposed acquisitions of American companies by firms from these 
countries have generated controversy in the United States, and these three countries have 
all been the subject of previous survey research. Respondents in our sample were 6 
percentage points more likely to oppose an acquisition by firms from China, 4 
percentage points less likely to oppose an acquisition by firms from Japan, and 5 
percentage points more likely to oppose an acquisition by firms from Saudi Arabia being 
                                                
92 Jensen and Lindstädt 2013. 
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blocked. Our results are consistent with previous research suggesting that Americans are 
more opposed to investments from China and Saudi Arabia than generic ‘foreign 
countries,’ but more receptive to investments from Japan.93 
 Figure 1 also suggests that the ownership of the foreign firm has minimal impact 
on support for blocking potential acquisitions. Opposition only increases by 1 percentage 
point when the foreign firm is government owned compared to privately owned firms. 
Unlike the ownership of the foreign firm, the national security risk of the industry being 
targeted had a large effect. More specifically, opposition increases by 17 percentage 
points when the targeted companies are in industries where the national security risk was 
high compared to industries where the national security risk was low. 
 In contrast to the large effect of the national security treatment, the two 
treatments that are proxies for the economic impact of the transaction had relatively 
small effects. Opposition only increased by 1 percentage points when the foreign firm 
targeted a company that is a national Fortune 500 company compared to small, local 
companies. Additionally, support increased by 2 percentage points when the foreign firm 
targeted companies in industries with rates of unemployment above the national average 
compared to companies in industries with rates of unemployment below the national 
average. 
Figure 2 presents the results from the respondents in China. For the reciprocity 
treatment, the Chinese respondents reacted comparably to American respondents. For the 
Chinese respondents, opposition increased by 8 percentage points when the foreign 
firms’ home country has ‘a number of restrictions’ on Chinese firms acquiring their 
companies and by 19 percentage points when the home country has ‘an absolute 
prohibition’ on Chinese firms acquiring their companies. As with the American 
respondents, opposition decreased by 5 percentage points when the foreign firms’ home 
country had signed a treaty providing Chinese companies the ability to acquire their 
companies. These results indicate that reciprocity is a major concern for both American 
and Chinese respondents. 
                                                
93 Jensen and Lindstädt 2013. 
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 The results for the Ownership treatment were also similar to the American 
sample: whether the foreign firm was privately or government owned had little impact 
on levels of support. In contrast, the size of the firm being targeted did impact the levels 
of opposition. Opposition increased by 11 percentage points when the foreign firm 
targeted a large national company compared to a small, local company. Finally, the 
Chinese respondents’ support increased by 7 percentage points when the foreign firm 
targeted a company in an industry with high rates of unemployment compared to 
companies in industries with low unemployment. 
 
5. ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTS  
 
5.1. Secondary Experiment: Effect of Changes in Foreign Governments’ Policies 
 
 Our Primary Experiment revealed that reciprocity had a strong effect on public 
opposition to the acquisition of domestic firms. A complete lack of reciprocity increased 
opposition by 16 percentage points for American respondents and by 19 percentage 
points for Chinese respondents. However, the results also revealed that a positive 
reciprocal investment policy—signing a treaty to eliminate barriers—only increased 
support for acquisitions by 1 percentage point for American respondents and by 5 
percentage points for Chinese respondents. 
Because we were interested in the relationship between positive and negative 
reciprocity, our survey also included a Secondary Experiment focused solely on this 
relationship. We included this experiment because our conjoint analysis tested the effect 
of reciprocity on respondents’ support for blocking a specific transaction involving a 
single firm, but we also wanted to measure the effect of reciprocity on levels of support 
for broader restrictions on foreign acquisitions. We also wanted to frame government 
decisions in an active way; that is, saying that the foreign government had recently 
increased (or decreased) restrictions on investment. 
In the Secondary Experiment, respondents were told that their country is 
considering changing its policies on the purchase of domestic companies by foreign 
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firms.94 The respondents were then told that a foreign country has recently made one of 
five changes in their policies towards acquisitions of their companies. Specifically, the 
respondents were randomly told that the foreign government had made it either: (1) 
‘much harder’, (2) ‘somewhat harder’, (3) ‘no change in its process’, (4) ‘somewhat easer’, 
or (5) ‘much easier’ for US (Chinese) companies to buy companies in their country. The 
respondents were then asked whether the United States (China) should make it harder or 
easier for companies from that foreign country to acquire domestic companies. 
 The top panel of Figure 3 presents the results for American respondents and the 
bottom panel presents the results for Chinese respondents. Each horizontal line 
represents a different level of restriction that respondents were told the foreign country 
had recently implemented. The x-axis places responses on a scale from whether 
respondents thought it should be ‘much easier’ (set at 0) or ‘much harder’ (set at 1) for 
foreign companies to buy domestic companies. The dots represent the mean responses 
and the lines represent the 95% confidence intervals for each treatment. 
Changes in reciprocal market access had a significant impact on how open 
American respondents thought that the United States should be to foreign investment. 
When a foreign country has made it much harder for American companies to acquire 
their domestic firms, the mean response was 0.77. On the other end of the spectrum, 
even when the foreign country has made it ‘somewhat easier’ or ‘much easier’ for 
American firms to acquire their companies, American respondents still were more 
supportive of restricting access than increasing it. Specifically, both treatments had mean 
responses of 0.60. Further, the deviation from the baseline of no change (0.65) was 
smaller in the case of positive changes versus negative changes, but the difference does 
not reach conventional levels of statistical significant (p = 0.10). 
 Changes in reciprocal market access also had a significant impact on how open 
Chinese respondent thought that China should be to foreign investment. The mean 
response was 0.69 when the foreign country made it ‘much harder’ and 0.48 when the 
foreign country made it ‘much easier.’ The deviation from the baseline of no change 
                                                
94 Part 4 of the Supplementary Materials provides the wording of this experiment.   
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(0.56) was smaller in the case of positive changes versus negative changes, but the 
difference also does not reach conventional levels of statistical significant (p = 0.19).  
 There are two things worth noting about these results. First, these results provide 
some suggestive evidence that positive reciprocity may be less strong than negative 
reciprocity, but the results for both American and Chinese respondents failed to reach 
statistical significance at conventional levels. Second, for all five treatments, Chinese 
respondents were less supportive of increasing investment restrictions than the American 
respondents. This finding could be a result of differences in our samples, Chinese 
respondents being more open to foreign investment than Americans generally, or 
respondents’ views being influenced by the very different absolute levels of restrictions 
currently in place in the United States and China.  
 
5.2. Follow-up Experiment: Positive and Negative Reciprocity 
 
The Secondary Experiment only informed respondents about recent changes in 
another country’s level of openness to foreign investments—it did not tell them about 
the other country’s absolute level of openness to foreign investments. It is thus possible 
that the results are driven by beliefs about absolute levels of market access. For example, 
if American respondents believed that US investment policies were already dramatically 
more open than China’s, Americans may consequently not feel the need to make the 
United States more open to foreign investment in response to China opening its markets. 
In other words, beliefs about the absolute level of market access may influence 
willingness to punish negative policy changes or reward positive policy changes. 
Given this concern, we conducted a follow-up experiment designed to 
manipulate changes in market access and absolute levels of market access. The 
experiment was fielded in June 2015 to 838 respondents in the United States recruited 
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mTurk) service. We elected to field our experiment 
through mTurk because it offers the practical advantage of being dramatically cheaper 
than recruiting respondents through traditional firms, but research has suggested that 
mTurk still produces reliable results.95 It is because of these desirable properties that 
                                                
95 Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012. 
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mTurk has been widely used by political scientists to recruit respondents generally.96 As 
in our case, it has also been used to recruit respondents for follow-up experiments 
conducted after using traditional firms for primary experiments.97 The trade-off is that 
mTurk samples are less likely to be representative of the general population than those 
recruited by traditional firms, which potentially limits the generalizability of  results.98  
In our Follow-Up Experiment, respondents were told that “[o]n a scale of 0 to 
10, where 0 is no restrictions and 10 is an absolute ban on foreign ownership, in 
the past, Country A has had a score of [Past Score Treatment] for the ability of US 
companies to buy companies in Country A. Today this country is now a [Present Score 
Treatment].” 99  For both the Past Score Treatment and Present Score Treatment, 
respondents were randomly told that the levels were 0, 3, or 6. We thus had nine total 
treatment conditions. We then told the respondents that the United States is currently a 3 
on this scale and asked the respondents whether the United States should make it easier 
or harder for companies from Country A to buy American companies.100  
                                                
96 E.g. Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014; Huff and Kertzer 2017; Rho and 
Tomz 2017. 
97 E.g. Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Tomz and Weeks 2013. 
98 For example, our mTurk sample is younger and more educated than our representative 
sample recruited by SSI. Parts 1 and 2 of the Supplementary Material provide information on 
the recruitment and demographic characteristics of our mTurk sample. 
99 Part 5 of the Supplementary Materials provide the wording of this experiment.  
100 To alleviate concerns that this vignette might confuse respondents, we administered a 
comprehension quiz about the meaning of the scores to the respondents before they 
completed the experiment. 85 percent answered correctly. We then provided an additional 
explanation to anyone that answered incorrectly. Part 8 of the Supplementary Materials 
breaks down the results of Figure 4 by respondents that did and did not answer correctly.   
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Figure 4 presents the baseline results of this experiment. The horizontal axis runs 
from 0 (make much harder) to 1 (make much easier) and the vertical axis has each of the 
possible treatment conditions. Each condition first lists the Past Score and then the 
Present Score. For example, ‘3-6’ means the respondents were told that the country 
previously had a score of ‘3’ but now has a score of ‘6’ (in other words, the country had 
increased restrictions on foreign investments). 
There are several findings worth noting in Figure 4. First, when the other country 
was at the same level as the United States in both the past and present (‘3-3’), the mean 
response was that the United States should not change its current policy. To be exact, the 
mean response for the ‘3-3’ treatment was 0.49. Second, the respondents were most 
likely to favor making it much easier for foreign firms to buy US companies when the 
other country had the most open score (‘0’) in the present treatment. The respondents 
were most likely to favor making it much harder for foreign firms to buy US companies 
when the other country had the least open score (‘6’) in the present treatment.  
 Although these results are informative, our goal with this experiment was to test 
the relationship between positive and negative reciprocity while simultaneously 
manipulating changes in market access and absolute levels of market access. Specifically, 
this experiment was designed to test the difference between positive and negative 
reciprocity by comparing responses for pairs of treatments that meet two criteria: (a) the 
size of movement between the past and present treatment are the same size; and (b) they 
are now equidistant from the United States position of ‘3.’ There are four pairs of 
treatments that meet these criteria: (1) ‘0-0’ & ‘6-6’; (2) ‘6-0’ & ‘0-6’; (3) ‘3-0’ & ‘3-6’; and 
(4) ‘6-3’ & ‘0-3.’ For example, when we compare ‘6-0’ to ‘0-6,’ both moved by ‘6’ and 
both countries now have policies that are equidistant from ‘3.’ If negative and positive 
reciprocity were equally strong, then these two treatments would produce an average 
response that was the same distance from the baseline treatment of ‘3-3.’ If negative 
reciprocity has a larger effect, however, then ‘0-6’ would have a treatment effect that is a 
greater distance from the baseline of ‘3-3’ than ‘6-0.’  
To formally test this, we calculated a set of differences utilizing the ‘3-3’ 
treatment as a baseline. More specifically, we estimated a regression model with all the 
treatment conditions as independent variables, clustered the standard errors by 
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respondent, and then differenced the coefficients appropriately. This produces the 
‘difference-in-absolute differences’ between the four matched pairs, whereby a negative 
value indicates that negative reciprocity had a larger treatment effect and a positive value 
indicates that positive reciprocity had a larger treatment effect. 
Figure 5 presents these results. Each line represents one of the four matched 
pairs. To read Figure 5, take the matched pair of ‘0-0’ & ‘6-6’ that is presented in the first 
line. The baseline ‘3-3’ treatment had an average response of 0.49. The ‘0-0’ treatment—
which asked respondents to consider a country that was more open to foreign 
investments than the United States—had an average response of 0.45. The absolute 
value of the distance between the ‘0-0’ treatment and the baseline ‘3-3’ treatment was 
thus 0.04. 
In contrast, the ‘6-6’ treatment—which asked respondents to consider a country 
that was less open to foreign investments than the US—had an average response of 
0.58. The absolute value of the distance between the ‘6-6’ treatment and the baseline ‘3-
3’ treatment was 0.09. When you subtract this value (0.09) from the value for its matched 
pair (0.04), the result is -0.05. This is the result reported in the first line of Figure 5. In 
other words, for this matched pair, there is a bigger effect for the negative reciprocity 
treatment than the positive reciprocity treatment. This difference, however, falls just 
short of statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
Figure 5 shows that for all four matched pairs, the effect of the negative 
reciprocity treatment is larger than the matched positive reciprocity treatment. The effect 
is statistically significant at the 0.05 level for two of the pairs and at the 0.1 level for three 
of the pairs. The effect is not statistically significant for the fourth pair (‘6-3’ to ‘0-3’). 
But it is worth noting that this is the only pair where the foreign country ends with the 
same policy as the United States (‘3’), and perhaps unsurprisingly, the respondents simply 
answered that the United States should not change its policy. Taken together, these 
results provide evidence suggesting may more readily support punishing other countries 
for bad behavior than rewarding them for good behavior.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
Our results suggest that reciprocity has an influence on opposition to foreign 
acquisitions of domestic companies. When a foreign firm’s home country restricts 
investments from the respondents’ country, the respondents are more likely to oppose 
potential transactions. This result is consistent with findings that fairness and reciprocity 
are important drivers of attitudes about foreign affairs generally,101 and findings that 
reciprocity is an important driver of public opinion about specific areas of international 
relations.102  
We also found some suggestive evidence that the effect of positive reciprocity 
may be less strong than that of negative reciprocity. In other words, the public may want 
their government to block investments from countries that restrict FDI flows, but may 
be less likely to support easing restrictions on firms from countries with few limitations 
on foreign investments. This finding, although inconclusive, is consistent with findings 
from experiments in psychology and economics about individual responses to negative 
and positive reciprocity.103 It is also consistent with the fact that there have been calls in 
the United States to restrict investments from countries that do not provide access to 
American firms, but there have not been parallel proposals to provide additional market 
access to countries that have fewer market restrictions than the United States.104 
 Before continuing, it is important to acknowledge that although our experiments 
suggest that reciprocity has an influence on public opinion on FDI, they do not 
demonstrate why reciprocity might affect opinion. It is possible that individuals care 
about reciprocity because they believe that it will induce co-operative behavior from 
other countries, or that individuals care about reciprocity because believe they fairness 
norms are important. Relatedly, it may simply be the case that FDI is a ‘hard’ issue for 
                                                
101 E.g. Brewer et al. 2004; Kertzer et al. 2014; Kertzer and Rathbun 2015. 
102 E.g. Chilton 2015; Tingley and Tomz 2014. 
103 Fehr and Gächter 2000. 
104 Graham and Krugman 1995, 157. 
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the public to process,105 and reciprocity thus may be an appealing heuristic because it 
provides an intuitive answer to a hard question. Future research will be required to 
adjudicate between these possible explanations.  
There are several caveats to our results that should be noted. First, the effect of 
reciprocity on attitudes towards FDI may be particularly strong in the United States and 
China. Both countries are major sources of outward FDI as well as leading destinations for 
inward FDI. This may lead respondents in these countries to care more about reciprocal 
market access than respondents would in countries with less outward FDI. Second, we 
focused on M&As and not Greenfield investments. We choose M&As in part because 
we believed they would produce stronger public reactions, so reciprocal access for other 
forms of FDI may produce weaker responses. Third, our survey experiments asked 
respondents for their opinions on individual transactions, and as a result they may not 
have fully captured the temporal aspects of reciprocity. Future research is needed to 
determine whether repeated FDI interactions attenuate the effect of reciprocity, or lead 
to patterns of escalation or de-escalation. Fourth, although we found that reciprocity was 
an important determinant of public opposition to proposed foreign investments, this 
does not mean that these views would necessarily drive changes in actual policy. By 
showing that reciprocity can change public opinion, our results provide evidence for one 
step in a possible causal chain—they do not prove every link.106  
                                                
105 Carmines and Stimson 1980. 
106 As previously noted, there is research suggesting that public opinion is an important 
driver of globalization policy (Kono 2008; Scheve and Slaughter 2007). Of course, public 
opinion on FDI restrictions may be more likely to translate into policy changes in a 
democratic country like the United States than in an autocratic country like China. That said, 
although Chinese leaders do not have to respond to electoral concerns, research has 
suggested that mass opinion in China does influence the policies that the ruling coalition 
adopts (Chen Weiss 2013). 
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 With those caveats in mind, we believe that our results make an important 
contribution to understandings of what influences public opinion on both foreign 
investment specifically and IPE more generally. Our results indicate that public attitudes 
change based on the policies that other countries adopt towards FDI. As previously 
noted, prior scholarship has focused on explaining attitudes towards IPE in economic 
and sociological terms, while largely ignoring public attitudes towards other countries’ 
behavior.107 Our results suggest that there are limits to theories seeking to explain attitudes 
towards global economic integration exclusively in terms of domestic consequences or 
individual respondents’ characteristics. Our findings also highlight the need for further 
inquiry. How much weight do individuals evaluating foreign investments place on 
domestic consequences—like the effects on the economy or national security—
compared to concerns like reciprocity? How does the preference for reciprocity translate 
into policy? Can policy instruments that try to ensure liberalization—like multilateral and 
bilateral treaties—help constrain countries? These are all questions we leave unanswered. 
But without answering them, it may be impossible to understand the wave of support for 
reversing economic integration that is sweeping the globe.  
                                                
107 Hellwig 2014. Of course, there are exceptions (e.g. Bechtel and Scheve 2013). 
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TABLES & FIGURES 
 
 
 
Table 1: Treatment Options (as presented to US respondents) 
Treatment Options 
Ownership  • privately owned 
• government owned 
 
Country (*) • a foreign country  
• a country that is a security threat to the United States 
• a country that is an economic competitor and security 
threat to the United States 
• a country that is an economic competitor to the United 
States 
• a democratic country 
• a non-democratic country 
• China 
• Japan 
• Saudi Arabia 
 
National Security (*) • Low 
• high 
 
Firm Size  • small company based in your area 
• national Fortune 500 company 
 
Economic Distress  • lower rates of unemployment 
• higher rates of unemployment  
 
Reciprocity • no restrictions on American companies acquiring 
corporations 
• a number of restrictions on American companies 
acquiring corporations 
• an absolute prohibition on American companies 
acquiring corporations 
• signed a treaty that allows American companies to 
acquire corporations 
 
* Indicates that this treatment was not presented to respondents in China. 
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Figure 1: Primary Experiment Results – US Respondents 
 
 
 
Note: Figure 1 plots the average marginal component effect relative to baseline 
conditions for each treatment condition. Standard errors clustered at individual level. 
Horizontal lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 2: Primary Experiment Results – Chinese Respondents 
 
 
 
Note: Figure 2 plots the average marginal component effect relative to baseline 
conditions for each treatment condition. Standard errors clustered at individual level. 
Horizontal lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
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Figure 3: Secondary Experiment Results – US & Chinese Respondents 
 
 
 
Note: Figure 3 plots answers to the reciprocity follow up experiment for US & Chinese 
respondents. Subjects told that a country has recently made some change to their policy 
(different horizontal lines) for how easy it is for a foreign firm to buy a domestic firm. 
What should the response of their own country be? Horizontal lines indicate 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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Figure 4: Follow-Up Experiment Results – Baseline 
 
 
 
 
Note: Figure 4 plots the baseline results of the reciprocity follow-up experiment. 
Preferred US position (x-axis) versus other country past and present position (y-axis, 0 
(no restrictions) to 10 (complete restrictions)). Horizontal lines indicate 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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Figure 5: Follow-Up Experiment Results – Negative vs. Positive Reciprocity 
 
 
 
Note: Difference in absolute deviations from baseline position of country at 3-3. Positive 
values indicate that the magnitude of change was greater in responding to positive 
changes by a country (positive reciprocity larger). Negative values indicate that the 
magnitude of change was greater in responding to negative changes by a country 
(negative reciprocity larger). 
 
3-3 to 6-3 VS 3-3 to 0-3
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Reciprocity and Public Opposition to Foreign Direct Investment 
 
 
 
Supplementary Materials 
These Supplementary Materials provide eight pieces of information. Part 1 provides 
additional information on the recruitment of subjects for our experiments. Part 2 
provides the demographic characteristics of the respondents to whom we fielded our 
experiments. Part 3 provides the wording of the primary experiment that we fielded to 
respondents in the United States and China. Part 4 provides the wording of the 
secondary experiment on the effect of foreign governments changing their policies that 
we fielded to respondents in the United States and China. Part 5 provides the wording of 
the follow-up experiment on positive and negative reciprocity that we fielded to 
respondents recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service. Part 6 provides 
results tables presenting the results from the figures in the paper. Part 7 provides the 
results for the conjoint experiments while just using the first profile that respondents 
were asked to evaluate. Part 8 provides the results of our Follow-Up experiment while 
breaking out respondents based on whether they passed a quiz to test their competence.  
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1. SUBJECT RECRUITMENT 
Our Primary and Secondary Experiments were fielded online in February 2015 to 
subjects recruited by Survey Sampling International (SSI). SSI is a company based in 
Shelton, CT that recruits respondents in over 90 countries for survey research conducted 
by businesses and researchers. SSI employs opt-in recruitment methods to construct its 
panels of potential respondents. SSI then sends survey invitations to respondents based 
on the criteria selected by the business or researchers. More information on SSI’s 
sampling procedures is available at: https://www.surveysampling.com/site/assets/files/ 
1069/esomar-28-questions.pdf (last visited January 13, 2017).  
 
SSI has been used to recruit samples for survey research by academics in a number of 
fields. For examples of recent political science research using samples recruited by SSI, 
see Adida, Davenport, & McClendon (2016); Chilton & Versteeg (2016); Kertzer and 
Brutger (2016); Ryan (2016); Sen (2016); Iyengar & Westwood (2015); Berinsky, 
Margolis, & Sances (2014); Duch, Przepiorka, & Stevenson (2014); Malhotra, Margalit, & 
Mo (2013); Malhotra & Margalit (2010); Kam (2012); Popp & Rudolph (2011); Healy, 
Malhotra, & Mo (2010); Barker, Hurwitz, & Nelson (2008).  
 
We engaged SSI to distribute the U.S. version of our experiments to a sample of 
respondents in the United States that was nationally representative based on gender, age, 
ethnicity, and census region. We also engaged SSI to distribute the Chinese version of 
our experiments to a sample of respondents that was stratified to reflect Chinese 
populations’ gender, age, and region. SSI specifically recruited 2,010 adults in the United 
States and 1,659 adults in China to take our experiments. 
 
Our Follow-Up Experiment was fielded online in June 2015 to subjects recruited 
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform (mTurk).  mTurk is an online platform 
where “requesters” (like academic researchers) can recruit “workers” to complete various 
tasks. Researchers interested in fielding surveys through mTurk post on this online 
platform a link to their survey, how long it will take, and how much the workers will be 
compensated for completing it. More information on mTurk is available at: 
https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome (last visited January 13, 2017).  
 
mTurk has also been used to recruit samples for survey research by academics in a 
number of fields, and research suggests that the workers recruited through the platform 
perform well compared to respondents recruited through traditional methods (Huff & 
Tingely 2015; Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz 2012; Germine et al. 2012; Mason & Suri 2012; 
Paolacci, Chandler & Ipeirotis 2010). For examples of recent political science research 
using samples recruited by mturk, see Rho & Tomz (2016); Chilton (2015); Hainmueller 
& Hopkins (2015); Chaudoin (2014); Hainmueller, Hopkins, & Yamamoto (2014), Tomz 
& Tingley (2014); Tomz & Weeks (2013); Arceneaux (2012); Huber, Hill, & Lenz. (2012).  
 
We used mTurk to recruit 838 adults in the United States to complete our follow up 
experiment. Summary statistics of the demographic characteristics of our samples 
recruited by SSI and through mTurk are provided in the next section.  
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2. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF OUR SAMPLES 
 
     U.S. Sample      Chinese Sample    mTurk Sample   
 N % N % N % 
Gender       
        Female 1,100 54.86 708 43.52 398 47.49 
        Male 905 45.14 919 56.48 440 52.51 
       
Age       
       18-24 174 8.68 251 15.43 85 10.14 
       25-34 373 18.60 399 24.52 369 44.03 
       35-44 361 18.00 483 29.69 201 23.99 
       45-54 379 18.90 324 19.91 102 12.17 
       55-64 349 17.41 142 8.73 61 7.28 
       65-74 298 14.86 22 1.35 18 2.15 
       75+ 71 3.54 6 0.37 2 0.24 
       
Education       
        Less than high school 20 1.00 37 2.28 3 0.36 
        High school graduate 342 17.06 97 5.97 92 10.98 
        Vocational Training 90 4.49 418 25.71 25 2.98 
        Some College 589 29.38 108 6.64 271 32.34 
        College Degree 679 33.87 835 51.35 345 41.17 
        Graduate Degree 285 14.21 131 8.06 102 12.17 
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3. PRIMARY EXPERIMENT   
3.1. U.S. Version  
3.1.1. Intro  
In the screens that follow we will be asking for your opinion about how the US 
government should respond to the actions of different companies. In each we will 
describe both the company and what that company is doing. It is important that for each 
set of questions you read through all the details, and give a response to each situation. 
Please read each situation carefully and give us your honest response. Each of the 
situations is hypothetical, but may reflect something that has or could happen.  
3.1.2. Description  
A foreign company is considering acquiring an American owned company that is based 
in the United States. Please carefully read the following description of the foreign 
company and the proposed transaction. After you have finished reading, please answer 
the questions at the bottom of the page.  
3.1.3. Question  
Company A is a [Ownership Treatment] company based in [Country Treatment]. 
Company A is currently attempting to acquire an American company in an industry that 
is considered to pose a [National Security Treatment] risk to national security. The 
American company is a [Firm Size Treatment]. The American company is in an 
industry that is experiencing [Economic Distress Treatment] than the American 
economy overall. The country that Company A is based in currently has [Reciprocity 
Treatment] in the same industry. In your opinion, should the United States government 
prevent the proposed transaction?  
• Yes  
• No  
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3.1.4. Treatment Options 
 
Treatment Options 
Ownership  • privately owned 
• government owned 
 
Country • a foreign country  
• a country that is a security threat to the United States 
• a country that is an economic competitor and security 
threat to the United States 
• a country that is an economic competitor to the United 
States 
• a democratic country 
• a non-democratic country 
• China 
• Japan 
• Saudi Arabia 
 
National Security • low 
• high 
 
Firm Size  • small company based in your area 
• national Fortune 500 company 
 
Economic Distress  • lower rates of unemployment 
• higher rates of unemployment  
 
Reciprocity • no restrictions on American companies acquiring 
corporations 
• a number of restrictions on American companies 
acquiring corporations 
• an absolute prohibition on American companies 
acquiring corporations 
• signed a treaty that allows American companies to 
acquire corporations 
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3.2. Chinese Version  
3.2.1. Intro  
In the screens that follow we will be asking for your opinion about how the Chinese 
government should respond to the actions of different companies. In each we will 
describe both the company and what that company is doing.  
In the screens that follow we will be asking for your opinion about how the Chinese 
government should respond to the actions of different companies. In each we will 
describe both the company and what that company is doing.  
3.2.2. Description  
A foreign company is considering acquiring a Chinese owned company that is based in 
China. Please carefully read the following description of the foreign company and the 
proposed transaction. After you have finished reading, please answer the questions at the 
bottom of the page.  
3.2.3. Question  
Company A is a [Ownership Treatment] company based in a foreign country. The 
Chinese company is a [Firm Size Treatment]. The Chinese company is in an industry 
that is experiencing [Economic Distress Treatment] than the Chinese economy 
overall. The country that Company A is based in currently has [Reciprocity Treatment] 
in the same industry. In your opinion, should the Chinese government prevent the 
proposed transaction?  
• Yes  
• No  
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3.2.4. Treatment Options 
 
 
Treatment Options 
Ownership  • privately owned 
• government owned 
 
Firm Size  • small company based in your area 
• national Fortune 500 company 
 
Economic Distress  • lower rates of unemployment 
• higher rates of unemployment  
 
Reciprocity • no restrictions on American companies acquiring 
corporations 
• a number of restrictions on American companies 
acquiring corporations 
• an absolute prohibition on American companies 
acquiring corporations 
• signed a treaty that allows American companies to 
acquire corporations 
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4. SECONDARY EXPERIMENT: CHANGES IN FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS’ POLICIES 
4.1. U.S. Version 
4.1.1. Question  
The US is considering changing its policies on the purchase of US companies by foreign 
companies. Another country has [Present Treatment] for US companies to buy 
companies in their country. Should the US make it easier or harder for companies from 
this country to buy US companies? The US should:  
• make it much harder  
• make it somewhat harder  
• make no change  
• make it somewhat easier  
• make it much easier  
 
4.1.2. Treatments Options 
 
• recently made it much harder   
• recently made it somewhat harder  
• made no changes in its process    
• recently made it somewhat easier  
• recently made it much easier   
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4.2 Chinese Version 
4.2.1. Question  
China is considering changing its policies on the purchase of Chinese companies by 
foreign companies. Another country has [Treatments] for Chinese companies to buy 
companies in their country. Should China make it easier or harder for companies from 
this country to buy Chinese companies? The China should:  
• make it much harder  
• make it somewhat harder  
• make no change  
• make it somewhat easier  
• make it much easier  
 
4.2.2. Treatment Options 
 
• recently made it much harder   
• recently made it somewhat harder  
• made no changes in its process    
• recently made it somewhat easier  
• recently made it much easier!  !
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5. FOLLOW-UP EXPERIMENT: POSITIVE & NEGATIVE RECIPROCITY  
5.1. Introduction  
Next we are going to ask you about what the US should do in its relationship with other 
countries. It is important to pay attention to the description of each country prior to 
making your decision. We will describe each country’s policies about how hard or easy it 
is for US companies to purchase companies in that country. To simplify things, we will 
use a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is no restrictions and 10 is an absolute bans on foreign 
ownership. As context, the US is currently a 3 on this scale.  
[Note that prior to beginning this task, subjects were asked comprehension questions to 
ensure they understood what the numeric scores meant.]  
5.2. Question  
First consider Country A. On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is no restrictions and 10 is an 
absolute ban on foreign ownership, in the past Country A has had a score of [Past 
Treatment [0-10]] for the ability of US companies to buy companies in Country A. 
Today this country is now a [Present Treatment [0-10]]. As context, the US is currently 
a 3 on this scale. Should the US make it easier or harder for companies from this country 
to buy US companies? The US should:  
• make it much harder 
• make it somewhat harder  
• make no change  
• make it somewhat easier  
• make it much easier 
 
5.3. Treatment Options 
 
Past Treatments 
• 0 
• 3 
• 6 
 
Present Treatments 
• 0 
• 3 
• 6 
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6. RESULTS TABLES  
 
Figure 1: U.S. Conjoint Experimental Results 
Treatment Options Estimate Std. Err. 
Ownership Government Owned  0.013 0.009 
Country 
Security Threat  0.113 0.020*** 
Econ. Comp. & Sec. Threat  0.149 0.019*** 
Economic Competitor  0.040 0.020* 
Democratic Country -0.078 0.020*** 
Non-democratic Country  0.036 0.020 
China  0.058 0.020** 
Japan -0.039 0.020 
Saudi Arabia  0.045 0.020* 
National Security High Risk  0.174 0.010*** 
Firm Size A National Fortune 500 Company  0.011 0.009 
Economic Distress Higher Rates of Unemployment -0.015 0.009 
Reciprocity 
A Number of Restrictions  0.107 0.013*** 
An Absolute Prohibition  0.162 0.013*** 
Signed a Treaty -0.013 0.013 
 
 
 
Figure 2: China Conjoint Experimental Results 
Treatment Options Estimate Std. Err. 
Ownership Government Owned  0.004 0.011 
Firm Size A National Fortune 500 Company  0.112 0.012*** 
Economic Distress Higher Rates of Unemployment -0.066 0.011*** 
Reciprocity 
A Number of Restrictions  0.078 0.015*** 
An Absolute Prohibition  0.190 0.017*** 
Signed a Treaty -0.051 0.015*** 
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Figure 3: U.S. Respondents 
Treatment Mean Std. Err. 
Made Much Harder 0.767 0.008 
Made Somewhat Harder 0.741 0.008 
No Change 0.654 0.009 
Made Somewhat Easier 0.598 0.009 
Made Much Easier 0.596 0.010 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Chinese Respondents 
Treatment Mean Std. Err. 
Made Much Harder 0.689 0.006 
Made Somewhat Harder 0.656 0.006 
No Change 0.561 0.005 
Made Somewhat Easier 0.496 0.006 
Made Much Easier 0.476 0.007 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Reciprocity Follow Up Experiment 
Past Present Mean Std. Err. 
0 0 0.450 0.013 
0 3 0.521 0.009 
0 6 0.661 0.013 
3 0 0.417 0.013 
3 3 0.493 0.007 
3 6 0.641 0.011 
6 0 0.395 0.013 
6 3 0.496 0.010 
6 6 0.579 0.011 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Positive or Negative Reciprocity? 
Positive Change Negative Change Mean Std. Err. 
3-3 to 0-0 3-3 to 6-6 -0.042 0.023 
3-3 to 6-0 3-3 to 0-6 -0.070 0.024 
3-3 to 3-0 3-3 to 3-6 -0.071 0.023 
3-3 to 6-3 3-3 to 0-3 -0.004 0.021 
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7. CONJOINT RESULTS WHILE ONLY USING FIRST EVALUATIONS 
For our conjoint experiments, the respondents were asked to evaluate five vignettes. The 
figures below recreate figures 1 and 2 while only using the first evaluations from each 
respondent.  
Figure 1: First Evaluations Only 
 
• Figure 2: First Evaluations Only 
 
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
   signed a treaty that allows American companies to acquire corporations
   an absolute prohibition on American companies acquiring corporations
   a number of restrictions on American companies acquiring corporations
   (Baseline = no restrictions on American companies acquiring corporations)
Reciprocity:
   government owned
   (Baseline = privately owned)
Owner:
   high
   (Baseline = low)
Natsec:
   national Fortune 500 company
   (Baseline = small company based in your area)
Firmsize:
   higher rates of unemployment than
   (Baseline = lower rates of unemployment than)
Distress:
   Saudi Arabia
   Japan
   China
   a non−democratic country
   a democratic country
   a country that is an economic competitor to the United States
   a country that is an economic competitor and security threat to the United States
   a country that is a security threat to the United States
   (Baseline = a foreign country)
Country:
−.2 0 .2
Change in Pr(US should block acquisition)
●
●
●
●
●
●
   signed a treaty
   an absolute prohibition
   a number of restrictions
   (Baseline = no restrictions)
Reciprocity:
   government owned
   (Baseline = privately owned)
Ownership:
   large national company
   (Baseline = small company based in your area)
Firmsize:
   higher rates of unemployment
   (Baseline = lower rates of unemployment)
Distress:
−.2 −.1 0 .1 .2
Change in Pr(China should block acquisition)
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8. PASSED QUIZ FOR THE FOLLOW-UP EXPERIMENT 
To alleviate the concern that this vignette may confuse respondents, we administered a 
comprehension quiz about the meaning of the scores to the respondents before they 
completed the experiment. Eighty-five percent answered correctly. We then provided an 
additional explanation anyone that answered incorrectly. The Figure recreates Figure 4 from 
the paper while breaking out for the respondents that did and did not answer the quiz 
correctly. 
Figure 4: Responses Broken Out by if Respondent Passed Quiz 
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